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Scope of this course
1. Prerequisites
a. What is linguistic knowledge?
b. What are the functions of language?
c. What are the design features of natural language?
d. What branches and methods are there in linguistics?
2. Meaning: Approaches to the semantics of natural 
languages
3. Beyond meaning: Speech Act Theory and Gricean 
Inference
  
Course schedule
session topic reading
19.4. 1 introductory session n.a.
26.4. 2
the sign & functions of language
Akmajian et al. 1995 p. 5-9 AND 
Dirven/Verspoor 1998/2004 1-4
3.5. 3 linguistic knowledge Fromkin/Rodman 1998 3-27
10.5. 4 design features of language Yule 1996 p. 19-69
17.5. 5 branches and methods in linguistics Saeed Ch. 1 3-22
24.5. 6 meaning, thought and reality Saeed Ch. 2 23-52
31.5. 7 (cont) (cont)
7.6. 8 word meaning Saeed Ch. 3 53-79
14.6. 9 sentence relations and truth Saeed Ch. 4 79-106
21.6. 10 (cont) (cont)
28.6. 11 Gricean maxims Saeed Ch. 7 172-202
29.6. 12 (cont) (cont)
5.7. 13 speech act theory Saeed Ch. 8 203-227
12.7. 14 (cont) (cont)
19.7. 15 final exam Good Luck
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Course requirements
1. Come to class prepared, and participate
2. Short homework assignments asking you to 
discuss (some aspect of) a text
3. Final exam
  
Recommendations: General Intro
 Akmajian et al. (2001) 
Linguistics: An 
Introduction to Language 
and Communication. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press
  
Recommendations: Resource
 Bußmann (1999) 
Routledge Dictionary of 
Language and 
Linguistics.  
– ISBN 0415203198
 Lexikon der 
Sprachwissenschaft 
– ISBN 3520452030
  
Recommendations: Course book
 Saeed (2003) 
Semantics
– ISBN: 0631226931 
  
What is (natural) language?
 Language is a system of 
communication
 Human language is the most 
powerful communication 
system in the known universe
  
What is (natural) language?
 “Natural language” only applies to a 
language that has evolved naturally, 
and the study of natural language 
primarily involves native (first 
language) speakers.
 The understanding of natural 
languages reveals much about how 
the human mind and the human 
brain function.
  
What is linguistics?
 Linguistics is the scientific 
study of human language.
 How do we get from the physical 
properties of the sound waves in 
utterances to the intentions of 
speakers towards others in 
conversations?
– switch to praat visualization about here
– sound snippet
  
What is linguistics?
 Linguistic description is an 
attempt to reflect a speaker‘s 
(unconscious) knowledge about 
his native language.
 This description is devided into a 
set of subfields (branches)
  
What is linguistics?
 Branches of 
linguistics (core):
– Phonetics
– Phonology
– Morphology
– Syntax
– Semantics
– Pragmatics
Introduction to Phonetics 
and Phonology
Introduction (II): 
Morphosyntax
Introduction (I):
Meaning and Use
  
What else is there?
(peripheral branches) 
 Psycholinguistics
– Neurolinguistics
 Computational linguistics
– Corpus-linguistics
 Discourse analysis
 Historical linguistics
 Applied linguistics
 [...]
Natural Language Processing
  
Symbolic units (signs)
 Language can be viewed as a system of signs, i.e. 
pairings of form and meaning.
 A sign is something which stands for something 
else. 
Two sides of the coin:
Form and Meaning
SIGN meaning
form
  
Semantics - The study of 
meaning in language
i. I did not mean to hurt you.
intention
ii. He never says what he means.
intention to convey meaning
iii. She never means what she says.
intention diverging from meaning
___________________________
*Cf. Ogden, C. K. & I. A. Richards. 1923. The meaning 
of meaning. London: Kegan Paul.
  
Semantics - The study of 
meaning in language
i. Life without faith has no meaning.
value, significance
ii. What is the meaning of carnivorous?
language meaning
iii. What do you mean by the word concept?
speaker meaning
iv. Dark clouds mean rain.
indexical meaning
  
Semantics - The study of 
meaning in language
i.  He means well, but he’s rather clumsy.  
friendly disposition, intentions
ii. It was John I meant not Harry.        
reference
iii. Fame and riches meant nothing to the true 
scholar.                                        importance, 
significance
  
Semantics - The study of 
meaning of language 
Language/linguistic meaning
Reference
Speaker meaning
Linguistic expressions have 
(conventional) meanings
Linguistics expressions stand 
in some relation to an extra-
linguitic reality (world)
What speakers try to 
communicate is usually 
richer than what is said 
(strictly speaking).
  
Semantics - The study of 
meaning of language 
Language/linguistic meaning
Reference
Speaker meaning
<bank> : 
1. financial institution
2. Land sloping along each side of 
a river
<bank> 
S1: What time is it?
S2: Well, the milkman has just       
come.
  
Functions of language
  
Signs
What relations can hold 
between form and meaning?
Sign: pairing of form F and meaning S
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913)
  
Signs
motivated not motivated 
(arbitrary)
link between F and S 
contiguity similarity convention
Index SymbolIcon
C.S. Peirce (1839-1914)
  
Signs
i. signpost for traffic pointing towards the direction of the next town
ii. inverted triangle (traffic sign)
iii. smoke
iv. <smoke>
v. raising of eyebrows
vi. 3 (Arabic number)
vii. III (Roman number)
  
Signs
contiguity
similarity
arbitrariness
Sign A
Sign B
  
The principle of indexicality in language
i. I am now here
  
The principle of indexicality in language
Indexical (deictic) expressions
I, you, he,...
Now, then, tomorrow ...
Here, there, ...
come, go, ...
[...]
Need to be interpreted 
against a deictic centre
  
The principle of indexicality in language
deictic orientation versus inherent orientation
  
The principle of iconicity in language
I. Principle of sequential order 
Virginia got married and had a baby
Bill painted the green door|door green
II. Principle of distance
I made her leave
I wanted her to leave
I hoped that she would leave
III. Principle of quantity
That‘s a looooooong story
  
A simple model of 
communication
concentrates on the (intentional) “transfer” of information
(i)    I did not manage to get my ideas on paper
(ii)  The lecturer did not get his ideas across
  
Bühler I
Karl Bühler (1879-1963) 
Die Dinge
Einer (sender) Der Andere (receiver)
Organum
  
         Bühler II: Organon Modell
Karl Bühler (1879-1963) 
  
Multiple levels: An example
Scenario: 
A and B are sitting in a car. A is driving. B is on passenger seat. 
B:“It’s green.”
Aspects of the message:
•Sachverhaltsinformation (descriptive): 
The traffic-lights indicate that crossing the road is now permitted. 
•Appell (conative): 
Get going!
•Beziehungshinweis (phatic): 
Your reaction time is longer than mine
•Selbstoffenbarung (emotive):
I am in a hurry!
  
Jacobson
Roman Jacobson (1896-1982) 
  
Communication functions 
1 referential  (= contextual information) 
2 poetic (= autotelic) 
3 emotive (= self-expression) 
4 conative (= vocative or imperative addressing of 
receiver)
5 phatic (= checking channel working) 
6 metalingual (= checking code working) 
Roman Jacobson (1896-1982) 
Jacobson
  
“One of the six functions is always 
the dominant function in a text and 
usually related to the type of text.” 
For example, in poetry, the dominant function is the 
poetic function: the focus is on the message itself. 
Jacobson
Roman Jacobson (1896-1982) 
  
The properties of language
i.  me sneezing
ii.  me shifting around in my seat
iii. me wearing non-matching socks
iv.  'I would like to apply for the vacant position'
communicative vs. informative signals
        (intentional vs. Unintentional)
examples: signals
  
What is (natural) language: 
Design features
 Arbitrariness
 There is no rational relationship between a sound and its meaning (i.e. there is 
nothing "housy" about a house.)
 Discreteness
- L is composed of discrete units that are used in combination to create meaning
 Duality
- L works on two levels at once, a surface level and a semantic (meaningful) level.
 Productivity
- A finite number of units can be used to create an infinite number of utterances. 
•(cf. recursion)
 Displacement
- Languages can be used to communicate ideas about things that are not in the 
immediate vicinity either spatially or temporally.
 Cultural transmission
- Language is passed from one language user to the next, consciously or 
unconsciously.
  
An aside:
This one book for this lonely island...
"In order to understand recursion, one must 
first understand recursion." 
"If you already know what recursion is, just 
remember the answer. Otherwise, find 
someone who is standing closer to Douglas 
Hofstadter than you are; then ask him or her 
what recursion is." 
Douglas Hofstadter
(1945-)
  
Knowledge of language
A speaker's linguistic 
knowledge is tacit, i.e. 
unconscious.
Linguistics is the attempt to 
make this knowledge explicit.
(maybe switch to processing quickly)
  
Knowledge of the sound system 
(phonology)
-identification of sounds and sound 
sequences in language
Knowledge of words 
(lexical semantics)
-sound sequences signify some 
concept or meaning
Knowledge of linguistic structures 
(morphology and syntax)
-interpretation of language is 
structure dependent
Knowledge of language
  
Phenomenon 1:
(s) All the passengers on the plane would rather listen to Abbott and 
Costello than watch another crummy movie.
Phenomenon 2:
(s1) Sara is a graduate student.
(s2) William believes [that Sara is a graduate student].
(s3) Peter said [that William believes [that Sara is a graduate student.]]
(s4) Mary remarked [that Peter said [that William believes [that Sara is a 
graduate student.]]]
[s1, ... , sn]
Knowledge of language
  
From this it follows that a speaker (S) cannot have 
simply memorized the complete set of sentences of 
a language (L).
(=the  knowledge of L cannot be characterized as a 
list of sentences)
As a working hypothesis, we will say that linguistic 
knowledge is better conceived of as consisting of a finite 
set of rules and principles (mental grammar) applied to 
a finite set of lexical items (mental lexicon).
Knowledge of language
  
(i)      John is difficult to love.
(ib)    It is difficult to love John.
(ii)    John is anxious to go.
(iib) *It is anxious to go John.
(iii)   John promised me to go.
(iv)   John persuaded me to go.
Knowledge of language: 
curious stuff
  
Competence and Performance
(vi) A man that a woman loves ...
(vii) A man that a woman that a child knows loves ...
(viii) A man that a woman that a child that a bird saw knows loves ...
(ix) A man that a woman that a child that a bird that I heard saw knows loves ...
Ad infinitum (?)
Knowledge of language and 
performance
  
Structure dependence principle:
All grammatical operations are structure dependent.
» e.g. question formation rule in English (yes/no 
-questions)
Knowledge of language
  
Structure dependency: 
An example
Mininmal assumption: No structure dependency
Declarative: John can lift 500 pounds
1      2   3    4       5
Interrogative: Can John lift 500 pounds?
QR: Move item 2 to initial position
Now, consider:
- Many linguists are thought to be odd.
- The people who are standing there will leave soon.
  
Question formation rule
To form a (bipolar) question from a 
declarative sentence, locate the first 
auxiliary verb that follows the subject of the 
sentence and place it immediately to the left 
of the subject.
  
So, what do we “know” about 
language
Wherever humans exists, language exists.
There are no primitive language – all languages are equally complex
All languages change through time
The relationships between forms and meanings is for the most part 
arbitrary, but...
All languages utilize a finite set of discrete sounds (/forms) that are combined 
to form meaningful elements (words), which themselves form an infinite set of 
possible sentences
All grammars (mental grammars/competence) contain rules for the formation 
of words and sentences, but...
.
  
Block II: Semantics
Saeed (1997)
Chapter 1:Semantics in Linguistics
  
Three challenges
1. Circularity
2. Context
3. Status of linguistic knowledge
  
1. Circularity
How can we state the meaning of a word, except in other 
words, either in the same or a different language?
Example:
Ferret: 'domesticated albino variety of the polecat, Mustela 
putorius, bred for hunting rabbits, rat, etc.' 
Can we ever step outside this circle, i.e. step outside 
language to describe language?
Three challenges
  
2. Context
Features of context are part of the meaning of an utterance
Example:
“Marvelous weather you have here in Ireland”
Three challenges
  
3. Status of linguistic knowledge
How can we make sure that our definitions of a word's meaning 
are correct?
Related issues:
linguistic knowledge – encyclopedic knowledge
idiolect 
Three challenges
  
Meeting the challenges
Coping with circularity:
Designing a metalanguage with which we can describe 
the semantics and the rules of all languages
object language – metalanguage
But: Is such a metalanguage attainable?
  
Coping with relating linguistic to encyclopedic:
metalanguage might help here as well, since meaning 
representations involves arguing about which elements 
of knowledge should be included
Meeting the challenges
  
Coping with context:
traditional solution:
split expression's meaning:
context-free elements of meaning (semantics)
local contextual effects (pragmatics)
But: This is not exactly easy.
Meeting the challenges
  
Outlook
Attempt to create a semantic metalanguage
NOTE:
Although chapter 2 touches some of the issues already, the attempt to create 
a semantic metalanguage will be made only in chapter 10 of the book, which 
we will not be concerned with in this course.
We will only observe semantic relations among words (Ch. 3) and semantic 
relations that hold between sentences (Ch. 4). 
These latter relations will be described by means of the notion of truth, 
which has grown out of  the study of logic
However, we will have a look at the semantics/pragmatics-distinction 
(Ch. 7). 
  
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
“How is it possible [...] that by uttering strings of sounds I can 
convey information to  a listener about what is happening in a 
scene, say outside my window?” 
  
Reference as meaning
The referential theory holds that the meaning of a 
proper name is simply the individual to which, in 
the context of its use, the name refers.
(individual: numerically singular thing)
  
(i)  I saw Michael Jackson on television last night.
(ii) We've just flown back from Paris.
'Michael Jackson'  :  referring expression 
Micheal Jackson    :  referent
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
  
Extension and Denotation
<dog> set of (possible) 
dogs
term extension
denotes
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
  
Referential theory of meaning
Linguistic expression type real world referent
proper names denote individuals
(John, Germany, earth)
common names denote sets of individuals
(girl, planet, country)
verbs denote actions
adjectives denote properties of individuals
adverbs denote properties of actions
sentences denote situations/ events
  
Referring (R) vs. non-referring (NR) expressions
examples NR expressions
(and, so, very, maybe, if, not, all)
But nouns are R expressions, aren't they?  
Have a look at indefinite noun phrases:
(iii)  They performed a cholecystectomy this morning
(iv)  A cholecystectomy is a serious procedure
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
  
Constant vs. variable reference
(v)   I wrote to you.
(vi)  She put it in my office.
Expressions with variable reference deictic 
(or indexical) expressions  
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
  
The referential approach to meaning: Problems
i.   In the painting a unicorn is ignoring the maiden
ii.  World War Three might begin in the balkans
iii. Batman is a wimp
If a speaker using these expressions is not 
referring to anything in reality, and such 
reference is meaning, how do these 
sentence have meaning?
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
  
Further problems
Even if we are talking about things in reality, there is not 
always a one-to-one relationship between a linguistic 
expression and the thing we want to identify
i.   Then in 1981 Answar El Sadat was assassinated.
ii.  Then in 1981 the President of Egypt was assassinated.
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
Same reference, but same meaning?
  
Sense and reference
Gottlob Frege 
1848-1925
German mathematician, logician, and philosopher who 
worked at the University of Jena. 
Frege essentially reconceived the discipline of logic by 
constructing a formal system which, in effect, 
constituted the first ‘predicate calculus’. 
In this formal system, Frege developed an analysis of 
quantified statements and formalized the notion of a 
‘proof’ in terms that are still accepted today.
Frege conceived a comprehensive philosophy of 
language that many philosophers still find insightful.
  
Frege
Frege founded the modern discipline of logic by developing a superior 
method of formally representing the logic of thoughts and inferences. 
Figure: Frege's 'Begriffsschrift' (1879) already had the expressive power of modern predicate 
calculus.
  
Frege's puzzles
Frege's Puzzle About Identity Statements
Here are some examples of identity statements:
    117+136 = 253.
    The morning star is identical to the evening star.
    Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens.
    Bill is Debbie's father.
  
Frege's puzzles
Leibniz’ Law of the identity of indiscernibles 
states that if there is no way of telling two entities 
apart then they are one and the same entity. 
That is, entities x and y are identical if and only if 
any predicate possessed by x is also possessed by 
y and vice versa. 
 x and y can be substituted salva veritate 
  
However, they are obviously cognitively different:
given: Marilyn Monroe (A) = Norma Jean Baker (B)
A=B is more informative than A=A 
Someone who believes
that Marilyn Monroe is the most beautiful woman of all time 
need not have the same attitude towards the proposition 
that Norma Jean Baker is  the most beautiful woman of all time
Frege's puzzles
  
Interim conclusion: 
There is more to meaning then reference ( i.e. sense)
Sense places a new level between words and the 
world: the level of mental representation  
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
  
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
Referential theory of meaning
     content word
(e.g. N,V, Adj, Adv)
reference (extension)
entities (or sets/classes)
denotes
FORM:
<my house>
<house>
MEANING:
  
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
     content word
(e.g. N,V, Adj, Adv)
reference (extension)
entities (or sets/classes)
denotes
sense (intension)
concepts (mental reps)
means
determines
Semiotic triangle for content words
  
Referential theory of meaning
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
     content word
      (e.g. noun)
reference (extension)
entities (or sets/classes)
denotes
sense (intension)
concepts (mental reps)
means
determines
Semiotic triangle for content words
  
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
     content word
         (e.g. V)
reference (extension)
entities (or sets/classes)
predicates about
Predicate/Relation
means
is true of
Semiotic triangle for content words
  
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
     content word
         (e.g. V)
set of entities
(Mary, Peter, ball)
denotes
sense ~ concept
means
determines
Semiotic triangle for content words
  
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
     content word
         (e.g. V)
sense ~ concept
means
Semiotic triangle for content words
So, what exactly is a concept?
Unless we have a good idea of 
what a concept is, we are left with 
rather empty definition. 
  
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
Concepts:
What form can we assign to concepts?
How do children acquire them?
(we will focus on lexicalised concepts)
  
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
Necessary and (jointly) sufficient conditions:
WOMAN
X is a woman if and only if L
Where L is a list of attribute|properties|conditions like
x is human
x is adult
X is female
  
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
Necessary and (jointly) sufficient conditions:
Problems:
Well, for WOMAN this might work, but what about, say, 
BACHELOR 
x is human
x is adult
x is male
x is unmarried
x has never been married
Are these features jointly sufficient?
Are all of them necessary
What about the pope?
  
Meaning, Thought and Reality 
(Chapter 2)
Next session: Prototype Theory
(cancelled)
  
Course schedule
session topic reading
19.4. 1 introductory session n.a.
26.4. 2
the sign & functions of language
Akmajian et al. 1995 p. 5-9 AND 
Dirven/Verspoor 1998/2004 1-4
3.5. 3 linguistic knowledge Fromkin/Rodman 1998 3-27
10.5. 4 design features of language Yule 1996 p. 19-69
17.5. 5 branches and methods in linguistics Saeed Ch. 1 3-22
24.5. 6 meaning, thought and reality Saeed Ch. 2 23-52
31.5. 7 (cont) (cont)
7.6. 8 word meaning Saeed Ch. 3 53-79
14.6. 9 sentence relations and truth Saeed Ch. 4 79-106
21.6. 10 (cont) (cont)
28.6. 11 Gricean maxims Saeed Ch. 7 172-202
29.6. 12 (cont) (cont)
5.7. 13 speech act theory Saeed Ch. 8 203-227
12.7. 14 (cont) (cont)
19.7. 15 final exam Good Luck
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Word meaning (Chapter 3)
Working hypotheses (interim summary):
1. A word is a kind of linguistic sign
1.1. A word is a pairing of form and meaning
2. The description of word meaning involves the 
levels of intension (sense) and extension (reference)
3. A possible candidate of what sense is is the 
concept, i.e. the mental representation
3.1. A very influential approach to describing the semantic 
content of an expression is trying to find the set of 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that 
define the concept   
  
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
What is a word?
meaningorthographic word phonological word
unit of form
/ft/<foot>
has
  
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
Words in the mind
It is usually assumed in linguistics, that people must have a 
(relatively static) storage device, which is often called the 
mental lexicon or mental dictionary
Among the units in such a mental lexicon must be some basic 
entry forms, or lemmas
Example: lemma play
play, plays, played, playing --> play (lemma)
  
Such lemmas (minimally) contain information about:
The pronunciation of the word (phonological inf)
/ft/
The spelling of the word (orthographical inf)
<foot>
Grammatical category of the word (syntactic inf)
NOUN
Meaning/function of the word (semantic inf)
List L of necessary and jointly conditions defining the concept
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
  
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
Another important kind of knowledge that people 
have about words involves the relations that words 
exhibit to other words in the system
Hence, the lexicon may be conceived of as a 
network
  
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
Ambiguity
Vagueness
Synonymy
Antonomy
Hyponymy
Meronymy
So, what relations are there?
  
Homonymy
Homography
Ambiguity
Polysemy
Homophony
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
A form can be be associated with more than one meaning.
The meanings can be semantically related or unrelated: 
  
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
     Ambiguity vs. Vagueness
Are the meanings mutually exclusive?
Ambiguity
task for human comprehension system:
--> sense selection
Example:  bank
bank1: financial institution
bank2: edge of a river
Vagueness
task for human comprehension system:
--> shade meaning such that it is 
appropriate to context (specification)
Example:  
thing: Very general meaning (could be 
used to refer to anything)
baby: Depends on age and developmental 
stage of the child (denotation has flexible 
boundaries)
  
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
Meaning relations:
Synonymy: two forms have exactly the same meaning
--> true s~ is virtually non-existent in natural languages
If we disregard dialectal variation and very fine-grained 
semantic destinctions, we may find synonyms like
Examples:
Samstag - Sonnabend
Orange - Apfelsine
autumn - fall 
MEANING
FORM bFORM a
  
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
Meaning relations:
Opposition: two forms have opposite meaning
--> there are many relations which show oppositeness
1. Antonomy: Antonyms denote extreme opposites out of a 
range of possibilities
Examples:
old - young, big - small, difficult - easy
big smallneither nor
  
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
Meaning relations:
Opposition: two forms have opposite meaning
--> there are many relations which show oppositeness
2. Directional opposites are related to opposite directions on a 
common axis
Examples:
come - go, right of - left of, high - low
ascend - descend, yesterday - tomorrow
  
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
Meaning relations:
Opposition: two forms have opposite meaning
--> there are many relations which show oppositeness
3. Complementary opposites are logically complementary, i.e. 
the negation of one term is equivalent to the other term
Examples:
female - male, free - occupied, even - odd
  
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
Meaning relations:
Opposition: two forms have opposite meaning
--> there are many relations which show oppositeness
4. Heteronyms are elements of a set of terms which are 
contraries logically speaking
Examples:
days of the week, manner of motion verbs (walk, run, swim, 
fly,...)
  
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
Meaning relations:
Opposition: two forms have opposite meaning
--> there are many relations which show oppositeness
5. Converses: two expressions are converses of each other if 
and only if they express the same relation with reversed roles
Examples:
above (x,y)/ below (y,x)
entail (x,y) / follow from (y,x)
  
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
Hyponymy
plant
animate object
human
horsecat
animal
huskycollie
dog
co-hyponyms
Hyponym:
Hyperonym:
X is a kind of Y
(transitive relation)
  
Sentence Relations and Truth
(Chapter 4)
Hypothesis:
 
The tools of logic can help us to represent sentence 
meaning
A statement is true, if it is in correspondence with the 
facts, i.e. if it is a correct description of states and 
affairs in the world
  
Logic and truth
“To understand a sentence is to know 
under what conditions it is true”
‘Snow is white’ iff snow is white 
Tarski
Alfred Tarski 1902-1983
_______________________________________________
DW: possible alternatives: 
To understand a sentence is to know which experiences would confirm that 
sentence and which would disconfirm it  
  
Truth
As a first approximation, we can distinguish...
empirical (contingent) vs. analytic truth
e. Neil Armstrong was the first man on the moon.
f. This corpse is dead.
  
truth values and truth conditions
A sentence can be true or false (binary 
distinction; tertium non datur).
This value is called truth value (TV)
a. The pope is unmarried T (necessarily)
b. Triangles are two-dimensional. T (necessarily)
Same truth values but different truth conditions (TC)
The truth conditions of a sentence are the conditions that 
must hold such that the sentence is in accordance with the 
facts; i.e. TCs describe the states of affairs that would 
have to obtain in reality for the sentence to be true.
  
Some simple operators
Negation
Your car has been stolen
Your car has not been stolen
‘not’ is behaves like ‘¬’
p ¬p
______
T F
F T
  
Propositional logic
Truth tables
p
T F
T x y
q
F w z
Some configurations are 
prominent in propositional 
logic
(all values are binary; T/F) 
 
  
Some simple operators
Conjoining/coordinating
c. The house is on fire (p)
d. The firebrigade is on the way (q)
e. The house is on fire and the fire brigade is on the way
f. The fire brigade is on the way and the house is on fire
(c & d are truth-conditionally equivalent) 
‘and’ is (similar to) ‘&’  [or ∧ ] p q p&q__________
T T T
T F F
F T F
F F F
  
Some simple operators
Inclusive disjunction
c. I am going to have a steak tonite (p)
d. I am going to have a salad tonite (q)
e. I am going to have a steak tonite or I am going to have a salad tonite
f. I am going to have a steak or a salad tonite
g. But: I am either going to have a steak or a salad tonite (exclusive)
‘or’ is (similar to) ‘∨’  (i.e. inclusive or) p q p∨q__________
T T T
T F T
F T T
F F F
  
Some simple operators
Exclusive disjunction
c. I am going to watch soccer tonite (p)
d. I am going to watch a movie tonite (q)
‘or’ is (similar to) ‘∨e’  (exclusive or)
p q p∨eq
__________
T T F
T F T
F T T
F F F
  
Some simple operators
Material implication
c. If it rains, I am going to the movies (p)
d. It’s raining (p)
e. I am going to the movies (q)
‘If…then’ is (similar to) ‘→’  
p q p → q
__________
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
(this seems irritating, but don’t forget these are 
logical operators, not descriptions of English 
terms: 
if p is false, the claim p → q simply cannot be 
invalidated; so we treat it as T
By definition, material implication ‘→ ‘ 
produces a value of false if and only if the first 
operand is true and the second operand is false.  
  
more on material implication
p → q
p is a sufficient condition for q 
p is not a necessary condition for q 
Example:
If it rains (p), I get wet (q)
  
more on material implication
Counterfactuals
c. If wishes were money (p), we would all be rich (q)
p q p → q
__________
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
The truth-conditional relation misses our intuitions about the sense 
relations here, but that should not bother us too much. 
  
more on material implication
Biconditionals
c. If wishes were money (p), we would all be rich (q)
p q p ≡ q [or p ↔ q ]
__________
T T T
T F F
F T F
F F T
p and q must have the same truth value 
  
Entailment
p q
___________________
T  → T
F  → T or F
F  ← F
T or F  ← T
a. Someone killed Kurt Cobain (p)
b. Kurt Cobain is dead (q)
Entailment defined by truth:
A sentence p entails a 
sentence q iff the truth of p 
quarantees the truth of q & 
and the falsity of q 
guarantees the falsity of p 
  
Paraphrases
Paraphrase can be defined as mutual entailment relations
(p) The Etruscans built this tomb
(q) This tomb was built by Etruscans
p entail q and q entails p (p ≡ q | p ↔ q)
  
Presupposition:
Some examples
The present king of france is bald.
Presupposition:There exist an individual who is present king 
of France
Do you want to do it again? 
Presupposition: You have done it already, at least once.
My wife is pregnant. 
Presupposition: The speaker has a wife.
  
Presupposition
p q
_________________
T → T
F  → T
T or F ← T
?( T or F) ← F
Presupposition as a truth relation:
truth value gap
  
Presupposition triggers
Lexical triggers:
factive verbs: realize, notice, know, regret, forget, ...
Example:
p: I regret eating your sandwich|that I have eaten your sandwich 
q: I have eaten your sandwich (presupposition)
These verbs (and other like them) presuppose the truth of their objects
  
Introducing Pragmatics
2 central topics left:
Speech Act Theory
Linguistic exchange can be described 
from a theory of acts|action perspective 
(Handlungstheorie). 
The guiding question is something like: 
“What is it that people do when they utter 
a sequence of sounds?“ 
Gricean Inference
Listeners participate actively in the 
construction of meaning – in 
particular by drawing inferences 
to arrive at an satisfactory 
assessment of (the most likely) 
speaker meaning); 
How can these inferences be 
described?
  
Tasks for a hearer
Fill in deictic expressions
Fix the reference of nominals
Access background knowledge
Make inferences
  
Guiding hypothesis:
The economy principle 
It is a characteristic of natural language use that 
speakers calculate how much information their 
hearers need to make successful references.
Or more generally, how much information their 
hearers need to reconstruct the situation 
described by the utterance and the 
communicative intention of the speaker.
  
Guiding question
How exactly can we communicate more than what is 
actually said?
Example:
A: Care for some ice-cream?
B: I‘m on a diet.
Obviously we can, given an utterance, often derive a number 
of inferences from it. But how does this work? Why do me 
make some inferences (quite naturally and automatically) 
and not others?
  
Bridging inferences:
The role of background knowledge
i. I looked into the room. The ceiling was very high.
ii. John went walking out at noon. The park was beautiful.
v. He picked up the key and unlocked the door.
  
Bridging inferences
I left early (p). I had a train to catch 
(q).
Did you give Mary the money? – I‘m 
waiting for her now?
Inference: 
p because of q
Inference: 
S2 did not give the 
money to Mary 
How come we make these inferences so naturally and automatically?
Nothing in the logic of these utterances seems to license them.
  
Herbert Paul Grice
H. P. Grice 1913 - 1988
- important English philosopher of 
language and logic
- founder of modern pragmatics
- distinguished natural from non-
natural meaning
- sentence meaning vs. speaker‘s 
meaning
- Grice‘s concept of speaker‘s meaning 
is a refinement of the idea that 
communication is a matter of 
intentionally affecting another person‘s 
mental|psychological state
  
Cooperative Principle 
Grice proposed  an approach to the speaker‘s and hearer‘s 
cooperative use of inferences (outcomes of some reasoning)
The predictability of inference formation can be explained by 
postulating a coopperative principle.
S and H seem to assume a certain set of generally accepted 
maxims; these assumptions are exploited in communication. 
  
Cooperative principle (cont.)
Cooperative Principle:
“Make your contribution such as required, at the stage 
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction 
of the talk exchange in which you are engaged“
  
Co-operative Principle (cont.)
Now, the great thing of the account is that is provides 
an explanation (or a first indication) as to how we 
derive inferences.
The hearer (H) always assumes that, contrary to 
appearance of the utterance (U), the principles are 
nevertheless being adhered to at some deeper level
  
Maxims of conversation
I. Maxim of Quality
I. Try to make your contribution one that is true, i.e.
I. Do not say what you believe is false
II. Do not say for which you lack adequate evidence
III. Maxim of Quantity
I. Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes 
of the exchange (i.e. not more or less)
V. Maxim of Relevance 
I. Make your contribution relevant
VII. Maxim of Manner
I. Be perspicuous; and specifically:
I. Avoid ambiguity
II. Avoid obscurity
III. Be brief
IV. Be orderly
  
Maxim of Quality
try to make your contribution one that is true
(i) John has a PhD in analytical philosophy (p)
+> I believe p and I have adequate evidence of p
(ii) ?? John has a PhD in analytic philosophy, but I don‘t 
believe it
(cf. Moore‘s Paradox)
  
Maxim of Quantity
say as much as required
(i) Harry has 12 children
This conveys that Harry has not 
more than 12 children, although 
it is logically compatible with 
(ii)
(ii) Harry has 20 children
Harry
  
Maxim of Relevance
make your contributions relevant
(i) Pass the salt
+> pass the salt now
(if possible imperative will be interpreted as relevant to the present 
interaction)
A: Can you tell me the time
B: Well, the milkman has just come
  
Maxim of Manner
be brief, orderly - avoid obscurity, ambiguity
(i) Open the door
(ib) ?Walk up the door, turn the door handle 
clockwise as far as it will go, and then pull 
gently towards you
(ii) The lone ranger rode into the sunset and 
jumped onto his horse.
  
Co-operative Principle (cont.)
So, what exactly is this?
A stylistic advice?
An agreement in a social community?
A metaphoric description of how our cognitive 
system that governs communication operates?
Something even more general than this, i.e. could it 
be a characterization of how our mind interprets 
actions?
...
  
Co-operative Principle (cont.)
These maxims specify what participants (AGENTS) have 
to do to converse in a maximally efficient, rational, co-
operative way: they should speak sincerely, relevantly and 
clearly, while providing sufficient information
  
Co-operative Principle (cont.)
A: Where‘s Bill?
B: There‘s a yellow Porsche in front of Sue‘s house.
B‘s contribution –taken literally- fails to answer A‘s 
question!
Seems to violate maxims of of quantity and relevance (at 
least)
But A is likely to be satisfied with B‘s answer.
A assumes that B is co-operative, so he begins searching 
for possible connections between the location of Bill and a 
yellow Porsche ...
  
Co-operative Principle (cont.)
A: Where‘s Bill?
B: There‘s a yellow Porsche in front of Sue‘s house.
...thus A arrive at the suggestion (which B effectively 
conveys) that, if Bill has a yellow Porsche, he may be at 
Sue‘s house
So, inferences arise to preserve the 
assumption of co-ooperation
  
Proposed general pattern for 
drawing inferences
(i) S has said that p
(ii) There is no reason to think S is not observing the cooperative 
principle
(iii) In order for S to say that p and be indeed cooperative, S must think 
that q
(iv) S must know that it is mutual knowledge that q must be supposed 
if S is taken to be cooperative
(v) S has done nothing to stop me, the addressee, thinking that q
(vi) Therefore S intends me to think that q
  
Speech Acts
How to do things with words
Action, as a concept in philosophy, is what humans can do.
Philosophical action theory is concerned with conjectures 
about the processes causing intentional (wilful) human bodily 
movements of more or less complex kind. 
A basic action theory typically describes behaviour as the 
result of an interaction between an individual agent and a 
situation. 
  
Speech Acts
How to do things with words
The speech act can be described as "in saying 
something, we do something" 
  
Speech Acts
How to do things with words
John L. Austin
1911-1960
-another important British philosopher.
-graduate of Oxford, he was a fellow of All Souls (1933–35) 
and Magdalen (1935–52) colleges before he became White's 
professor of moral philosophy (1952–60), also at Oxford.
- strongly influenced analytic philosophy, urging that the use 
of words be closely examined and holding that the 
distinctions of ordinary language are more subtle than is 
usually realized.
  
- Mills Professor of Philosophy at the 
University of California, Berkeley
- noted for contributions to the philosophy of 
language, philosophy of mind and 
consciousness, on the characteristics of 
socially constructed versus physical realities, 
and on practical reason. 
- was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize in 2000. 
Speech Acts
How to do things with words
John R. Searle
1933-
  
Traditional assumptions in 
Philosophy of Language
I. Basic sentence type in language is the declarative 
(expresses statements or assertions)
II. The principle use of language is to describe states of 
affairs (by using statements)
III. The meaning of utterances can be described in terms of 
their truth or falsity
__________________________________________
Logical positivism: Vienna Circle (1922-1933):
Goal: Unified science
Two main features
I. experience is the only source of knowledge
II logical analysis performed with the help of symbolic logic is the 
preferred method for solving philosophical problems
Moritz Schlick 
1888-1936
  
Austin‘s opposition
There are declaratives that cannot be 
evaluated on the basis of truth and falsity
• I promise to take a taxi home
• I bet you five pounds
• I declare this meeting open
• I warn you that legal action will ensue
• I name this ship The Flying Dutchman
  
Performative Utterances
Q: So, are all of these sentences meaningless?
A: No, it is just not useful to ask whether they are true or not.
But if so: How should their meanings be described?
Austin claimed that these sentences were in themselves a kind 
of action (promises, warnings, threats,...)
Performative utterances are speech acts which 
perform the action the sentence describes.
  
Explicit Performative Utterances 
i. I (hereby) request that you leave my property
PRN 1st SG (hereby) VerbPERFORM  that S 
present
simple
indicative
active
Utterance of this type express most directly the 
intended communicative function.
They count as actions of the associated type
  
Speech Acts
Felicity conditions
A performative can be felicitous or 
infelicitous, i.e. it can work ... or not
There are social conventions governing the 
felicitous conditions of a speech act.
  
Speech Acts
Felicity conditions
I. There must exist an accepted 
conventional procedure having a certain 
conventional effect, the procedure to 
include the uttering of certain words by 
certain persons in certain circumstances...
III. The particular persons and circumstances 
must be appropriate for the invocation of 
the particular procedure invoked... 
  
Speech Acts
Felicity conditions
I. The procedure must be executed by all 
participants correctly...
III. ...and completely...
Austin then added sincerity conditions (=sets of requisite 
thoughts, feelings and intentions) and distinguished two kinds of 
infelicitous speech acts: speech acts can misfire and the can be 
abused
  
Speech Acts
Felicity conditions
Infelicitous speech act
misfire
Violation of conditions 
specified in I-IV
abuse
Speaker is insincere 
(violation of sincerity/
sincerity conditions not 
met)
  
When saying something, one is simultaneously doing 
something…but what?.
I. Utterance Act (LA)
LA is performed in voicing words and sentences; 
II. Propositional act (PA)
PA is carried out by referring to entities and predicating states and actions.
III. Illocutionary Act (IA)
IA is the interpersonal act performed in speaking .
IV. Perlocutionary Act
The intended effect on the addressee is a 'perlocutionary act'. 
Speech Acts
How to do things with words
  
Speech Acts
Searle‘s classification
There is a myriad of (language particular) speech acts, but maybe these 
can be collapsed into a small number of coherent classes.
1. Representatives, which commit S to the truth of the expressed 
proposition. [asserting, concluding]
2. Directives, which are attemps by S to get H to do something
[questioning, requesting]
3. Commissives, which commit S to some future course of action
[promising, threatening]
3. Expressives, which express a psychological state
[thanking, apologising]
4. Declarations, which effect immediate changes in the institutional 
state of affairs and which tend to rely on elaborate extralinguistic 
institutions
[excommunicating, naming]
  
Speech Acts
Searle‘s classification
But how did he come up with this classification?
Three criteria:
1. Illocutionary point
incl. direction of fit (words - world)
2. Psychological state of S
3. Content of the act
  
Speech Acts
Felicity conditions revisited
Felicity conditions
preparatory propositional sincerity essential
  
Speech Acts
An example: Conditions for promising
“When I promise to mow your lawn, the preparatory conditions are that you want me to 
mow your lawn and that I believe that this is the case and that neither of us believes that I 
would in any case mow your lawn as part of the normal course of events; the propositional 
conditions are that my utterance ‘I promise to mow your lawn’ predicates the right sort of
act on my part; the sincerity condition is that I truly do intend to mow your lawn; and the 
essential condition is that my utterance counts as an undertaking on my part to perform this 
action.”
Barry (2003)
  
Speech Acts
An example: Conditions for promising
Where A = future action; P = proposition expressed in the speech act, e = 
linguistic expression
Preparatory 1:    H would prefer S‘s doing A to his not doing A   &
S believes H would prefer S‘s doing A to his not doing A
Preparatory 2: It is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal 
course of events
Propositional: In expressing that P, S predicates a future act A of S
Sincerity: S intends to do A
Essential: The utterance e counts as an undertaking to do A
  
Speech Acts
An example: Conditions for questioning
Where A = future action; P = proposition expressed in the speech act
Preparatory 1: S does not know the answer, i.e. for a yes/no-question, does 
not know whether P is true or false; for an Wh-question, does not 
know the missing information
Preparatory 2: It is not obvious to both S and H that H will provide the 
information at that time without being asked
Propositional: no constraints -> any proposition
Sincerity: S wants this information
Essential: The act counts as an attempt to elicit this information from H
  
Speech Acts:
direct vs. indirect speech acts (ISA)
Utterance direct act indirect act
Would you mind passing me the ashtray? question request
Why don‘t you finish you drink and leave? questions request
I must ask you to leave my house statement request
Leave me and I‘ll jump in the river order + statement threat
(secondary) (primary)
  
Speech Acts
How to interpret ISAs
Conditions for requesting
Preparatory condition: H is able to perform A
Sincerity condition: S wants H to do A
Propositional condition: S predicates a future act A of H
Essential condition: Counts as an attempt by S to get H to do A
Now, one way of performing an indirect request involves asking if 
thepreparatory condition obtains.
--> Can you open the window (asking for H ability to do A)
Another possibility is stating the sincerity condition:
--> I wish you would open the window
Or you question the propositional content condition:
--> Will you open the window (please)?
  
That‘s it. 
Thanks for your attention.
Best of luck for the final exam.
  
Word meaning (Chapter 3)
Meronymy
arm
body
trunk
ear
head
moutheye
face
co-meronyms
Meronym:
Holonym:
X has a Y
part/whole relation
(transitive relation?)
